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Pandemic Preparedness and Response
Effective pandemic preparedness and response depend on the quality as well as the speed of obtaining relevant 
information, especially from remote and hard to reach areas of the world, where most known and unknown disease 
outbreaks occur and originate. Equally important is the local/national ability to collate, analyze, and interpret the 
information in a form valuable for taking appropriate preventive action and response.
Beginning with the ProMED-Mail in 1994, other web-based systems for gathering information on disease occurrence 
followed. The systems developed in the U.S. include GOARN, EpiSimS, EpiSpider, Health MAP, and Google Flu 
Trends. The systems developed in other countries and regions include MedISys (Europe), GPHIN (Canada), BioCaster 
( Japan), GET WELL (Sweden), and Influenzanet, which was originally started by European countries but which now 
has multinational participation. These systems supplement national public health surveillance through information 
provided by volunteers.
While these systems have registered successes in the early detection and implementation of control measures that 
have prevented large scale epidemics, there have been some failures, such as the Ebola virus disease outbreak of 2014 
in West Africa. In general, the web-based systems have not functioned well in the parts of the world that are prone 
PREFACE
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to disease outbreaks. Many countries have limited health and internet infrastructure. Volunteers in these areas with 
poor internet connectivity are less likely to report occurrence of diseases and are even less likely to do so if there is an 
atmosphere of strict government regulations against the release of information.
Mobile Phone
The improvement and growth of mobile telephone networks in the developing world have opened opportunities for 
enhancing the sharing of disease information, even from remote areas. Ministries of health in many countries can now 
receive information about disease outbreaks from field workers all over the country using mobile phones. In addition, 
many ministries have better computer and internet services to analyze data and provide feedback to field workers 
for necessary action. Integrating national facilities into a global network will help with a large-scale integrated alert 
network for global action.
It is important, however, to take full advantage of mobile networks by creating national capacity to collate, verify, 
analyze, and interpret data collected from various health workers and volunteers within the country. An example is 
Nigeria’s successful transition from a polio-endemic country to a soon-to-be declared polio-free country. A national 
emergency operation center (EOC) consisting of programmers, public-health officials, epidemiologists, communication 
experts, data analysts, and support staff was established in 2012. At the Nigerian EOC, information on polio cases and 
polio immunization, collected from field staff using mobile phones, is collated and analyzed. The EOC then develops 
action plans based on data analyses and interpretation to solve the identified problems and improve the functioning 
of the polio eradication program. The positive turn around for polio eradication in Nigeria was not based solely on the 
availability of data but in having an operation center that was able to carry out rapid analysis and synthesis of data 
and make rapid decisions for improved program management.
For web-based surveillance systems to be more effective, it is important that the capacity to collate, analyze, interpret, 
and disseminate the information in a form that results in appropriate preventive action and response in the countries 
where these diseases originate.
The COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated the ability to obtain information from different sources and dissemination 
of such information globally. Despite the availability of information on the development of the pandemic from a Public 
Health Emergency of International Concern (PHEIC), many countries were unprepared when the pandemic finally 
reached their borders. It is not enough for countries to efficiently analyze disease surveillance data, they must actively 
prepare to prevent the entry of a disease into their territory and, at the same time, prepare plans and identify and 
initiate containment measures that need to be taken to prevent the establishment of the disease in the country.
Dr. Oyewale Tomori
Senior Fellow, Scowcroft Institute for International Affairs
Professor of Virology, Redeemer’s University, Nigeria
Former Vice-Chancellor of Redeemer’s University, Nigeria
Fellow of the Academy of Science of Nigeria
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Surveillance
Technological innovation has enabled the development 
of new strategies for infectious disease preparedness 
and response. Specifically, in the area of surveillance, 
global interconnectedness through the Internet, the 
advent of mobile technologies, and various web-
based algorithms have expanded the global health 
community’s ability to gather information from remote 
areas around the globe. The ability to rapidly detect 
an emerging outbreak is important in order to contain 
that outbreak at its source. As the ongoing COVID-19 
pandemic shows, outbreaks have a tipping point in 
which the focus shifts from containment to mitigation. 
If diseases can be brought under control prior to that 
tipping point, lives will be saved. This is the primary 
reason that technological innovations in surveillance 
are so critical. While there are a number of promising 
advances, the most talked about are web-based data 
sources and mobile technologies. In this section, we 
will discuss innovations in these technologies as well 
as the need to create an umbrella, integrated system 
that utilizes multiple types of surveillance technology to 
create a more robust system of surveillance.
Web-based Surveillance
The ability to conduct web-based surveillance has 
opened the door to gathering information from 
individuals in isolated regions and from those who may 
be sick but do not go to a doctor. A 2016 study (Choi 
et al., 2016) describe web-based systems as “intuitive, 
adaptable, low-cost, and operated in real-time.” One 
of the well-known web-based systems is the Program 
TOPIC AREA 1: TECHNOLOGICAL INNOVATION FOR
PANDEMIC PREPAREDNESS AND RESPONSE
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for Monitoring Emerging Diseases (ProMED), which was 
the first to report to the global health community the 
Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS), a respiratory 
disease that emerged in China in 2003 and the COVID-19 
outbreaks. Another well-known web-based system is 
the Global Outbreak Alert Response Network (GOARN), 
which helps coordinate responses in epidemic-prone 
areas. ProMED is the “largest publicly-available system 
conducting global reporting of infectious disease 
outbreaks” (ISID, 2020). It collects reports from people 
around the world, including physicians, researchers, 
and the general public, and this enables it to provide 
information to clinics and laboratories in real-time as 
diseases emerge. GOARN is a program overseen by WHO 
that “pools human and technical resources for rapid 
identification, confirmation, and response to outbreaks 
of international importance” (WHO, 2020). The WHO 
has worked with its partners in GOARN to support 
outbreak response in over 100 outbreaks, including the 
Ebola outbreaks of 2014 and 2018 and the outbreak of 
COVID-19 in 2019.
In addition to these systems, global influenza tracking 
through Internet search activity has become increasingly 
popular. The most prominent of these surveillance 
platforms is Google Flu Trend, which was recently 
discontinued largely because it proved inaccurate in 
its forecasts (Choi et al., 2016). The purpose of Google 
Flu Trends was to “provide real-time monitoring of flu 
cases around the world based on Google searches 
that matched terms for flu-related activity” (Walsh, 
2014). While Google Flu Trend proved useful in wealthy 
countries, it was not always reliable in low- and middle-
income countries. To counter the challenges of collecting 
accurate data in low- and middle-income countries, 
Clemente et al. (2019) developed a system known as 
ARGO. This system uses self-correcting machine learning 
as it combs Internet search data, which it combines 
with historical flu activity. The authors state that such 
a system has provided accurate, real-time flu data in a 
number of Latin American countries.
Other researchers have found the combination of 
Internet search data and social media information to be 
useful in accurately determining disease in a population 
(Deiner et al., 2016). With this system, Internet search 
data are used in conjunction with what residents in the 
target area are posting on their social media platforms, 
which can help to present a fuller picture than Internet 
search data alone because many people use social media 
for sources of information.
In line with the concept of combining Internet search 
information with social media information, some 
scholars argue that any form of new surveillance 
and response mechanisms must incorporate the 
local community. A 2019 study (Bedford et al., 2019) 
stated that people at the community level are the 
first responders to any outbreak. As such, any 
capacity building, whether traditional or based on a 
new technology platform, must be integrated into 
community-based programs. This perspective argues 
that advances in technology make it increasingly possible 
to expand community involvement, particularly in 
relation to wireless or mobile technology.
Mobile Technology
The use of mobile technology for infectious disease 
surveillance has been gaining traction over the past 
several years. Some scholars found mobile technology 
particularly promising in low-income countries and saw 
success in reporting on both human and animal health 
(Karmuribo et al., 2017; Garattini et al., 2019). In a 2017 
study (Karmuribo et al., 2017), researchers found that 
“the widening use of mobile phones in sub-Saharan 
Africa, where the penetration rate has reached 67 
percent, offers the opportunity to develop innovative 
participatory surveillance strategies that rely on the 
design and deployment of digital and mobile technology 
solutions” (p. e95). The most successful of these systems 
are those that are able to collect data on a mobile phone 
regardless of Internet access.
Mobile technology can be combined with geographical 
data by linking the reporting system to Google Maps. A 
2013 study (Li et al. 2013) explains that “users can gain 
baseline information at sites of emergencies, such as 
the baseline information of infectious diseases, hosts, 
vectors, medical services, geographic environment 
and climate” (p. e54842). All of this information can be 
integrated within the mobile platform to streamline 
information to the global health community (Lwin et al., 
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2019). GPS data can also help healthcare professionals 
understand when there is a highly contagious disease or 
an outbreak emerging.
A study conducted in remote areas of Tanzania showed 
promise in reporting real-time infectious disease data 
using an application called Epicollect. This was an 
application on villagers' smartphones that allowed them 
to upload geographical information about human and 
animal diseases (Mwabukusi et al., 2014). This and other 
One Health-oriented surveillance systems have the 
additional advantage of having the potential to identify 
zoonotic outbreaks in animals before they spill over into 
the human population.
Limitations
Despite the promise of Internet and mobile technologies 
in disease surveillance, there are a number of limitations 
and drawbacks. First, there is always the possibility that 
the information collected will be inaccurate or that the 
predictions based on the information will be inaccurate. 
A simple example of how this can happen comes from 
the 2014 case of Ebola in the United States. Once this 
case appeared, the number of people Googling “Ebola” 
or “Ebola symptoms” increased dramatically. While this 
data would typically be used to suggest that there was 
a growing outbreak of Ebola in the United States, the 
increase in Google searches in this case was a result of 
people’s lack of understanding about Ebola and fear that 
they could become infected.
The other significant, but less often discussed, drawback 
of web-based systems is the ethical concerns regarding 
gathering users’ data without their knowledge, as is done 
with Internet search data and other types of Big Data. 
Many people who voluntarily provide their data are not 
fully aware of how that data will be used, and others 
might not have any understanding of how the data are 
actually collected (Garattini et al., 2019).
There are drawbacks and limitations to using Internet 
search engine data or mobile technology for infectious 
TESTING
Once the pathogen (i.e., bacteria, virus, prion, etc.) causing a disease has been identified, we can begin a 
discussion about testing to determine which individuals are infected. Physical signs and symptoms are usual 
in evaluating suspect cases of infection but may be insufficient when there are high numbers of asymptomatic 
individuals. There is no stockpile of “off-the-shelf” tests for unknown diseases. Tests for unknown diseases must 
be invented, evaluated for false positives and false negatives, validated for accuracy, receive FDA approval, and 
be manufactured and distributed for use. No element of this is a simple or rapid process. Once laboratories have 
access to a sample of the pathogen, they can use sophisticated techniques, such as PCR or ELISA, to detect and 
identify the pathogen. Multiple testing may be necessary to determine if a person continues to have an active 
infection.
Once an individual has been infected with a pathogen, the person’s immune system can develop antibodies 
against that disease. Testing for these antibodies represents the second form of testing to determine if a patient 
has had the disease and recovered or, in some cases, has antibodies resulting from a vaccination. In many cases 
these antibodies can prevent the patient from contracting the disease again following a subsequent exposure to 
the pathogen. It can be difficult, however, to differentiate patients who have received a vaccine for a disease (and 
developed antibodies and immunity) from those who have had the disease. Importantly, antibodies commonly do 
not last forever, making reinfection possible. For those patients who develop antibodies as a result of vaccinations, 
booster shots may be necessary to maintain a protective level of antibodies. Many researchers and clinicians, who 
are exposed to infectious agents, have their blood levels of antibodies checked regularly to determine their level of 
disease resistance. Such testing is referred to as “Titering”.
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disease surveillance, but there is also great promise. As 
mobile technology continues to expand into the remote 
regions of the world, it offers a way to monitor disease 
and prevent future pandemics.
Creating an Integrated Early Warning System
Web-based surveillance and mobile technologies offer 
an opportunity for infectious disease surveillance 
that has never before been possible. As innovative 
as these methods are, however, there are additional 
important surveillance technologies, such as Geographic 
Information System (GIS) technology, that could be used 
in combination with other technologies. GIS is a tool 
that can be used for early mapping of infectious disease, 
giving public health officials a spatial awareness of 
disease spread that was not previously possible (Musa et 
al., 2013). The most common way that the technology is 
used today is to identify disease clusters.
The project PREDICT, which was a part of the United 
States Agency for International Development’s (USAID) 
Emerging Pandemic Threats program, was another 
Big Data attempt at early surveillance. The purpose of 
the program was to identify newly emerging zoonotic 
diseases that had the potential to spill over into humans 
(UC Davis, 2020). Utilizing this information, the program 
worked to targeted response measures before an 
outbreak occurred. Unfortunately, funding to the 
program was cut, and the program was discontinued in 
early 2020.
Technologies like Geographic Information System (GIS) 
and programs like PREDICT can be integrated with 
web-based surveillance and mobile technology to 
create a more robust pandemic surveillance system. 
In responding to an infectious disease, particularly if 
it is highly contagious, it is vitally important to enforce 
containment measures before the disease becomes 
widespread. An integrated system would provide 
multiple levels of infectious disease and spillover data, 
which would result in a system more robust than 
anything operating today while providing additional tools 
for healthcare workers.
Field Diagnostics
Rapid and accurate diagnostics are critical to guide 
disease containment throughout the world. For example, 
the COVID-19 outbreak may not have reached the scale 
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of a pandemic if it had been possible to diagnose the 
disease and isolate people when the first cases had 
appeared. Containing an outbreak at its source is not a 
new concept, but the application of the concept regularly 
proves challenging. One reason that point-source 
containment is difficult is that outbreaks frequently 
begin in low-income countries that lack adequate 
health and scientific infrastructure or in authoritarian 
governments that suppress information and reporting. 
The Nobel Prize winning economist, Amartya Sen, has 
famously argued that no famine has ever taken place in 
a democracy because of free speech and competitive 
elections. In a democratic nation, civil society will sound 
the alarm so that a food emergency does not deteriorate 
into a famine. The same is true for a major disease 
outbreak: Freedom of speech and press allow civil 
society, scientists, media, and members of the legislative 
branch of government to sound the alarm early on in 
ELECTRON BEAM
Every year the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs in the Bush School of Government and Public Service 
at Texas A&M University brings together scientists, policy-makers, and researchers from numerous disciplines at 
the Pandemic Policy Summit. While the Summit focuses on a variety of international problems, it also provides an 
opportunity for Texas A&M University to highlight new technologies impacting biosecurity that are actively being 
developed and tested in our research laboratories here on campus. These technologies and their applications to 
TAMU’s Global One Health will be presented in a series of vignettes in this section to provide a broad perspective 
of the ways we fulfill our mission as a Land-Grant Institution and protect public health.
We will begin with our National Center for Electron Beam Research (NCEBR) that is directed by Dr. Suresh Pillai. 
The NCEBR is an International Atomic Energy Agency Collaborating Center for electron-beam applications in food, 
health, and environmental applications. This technology uses a beam of electrons (E-beam) to sterilize anything 
from medical equipment to meals ready-to-eat (MREs). Although the electron beam can be focused, E-Beam 
devices are not handheld and require facilities designed with the ability to facilitate the passage of materials 
through the electron beam in order to achieve irradiation.
To provide some perspective, the following numbers may prove helpful. The “Gray” is used as a unit of ionizing 
radiation dose or absorbed dose in the International System of Units (SI). The Gray is equal to 1 Joule of radiation 
energy per kilogram of matter. Some may have seen the term “rad” being used, which is 0.01 Gray. A typical x-ray 
or CT scan may expose the patient to between 0.001 and 0.01 Gray of radiation. The electron beam uses between 
1,500 and 10,000 Gray to kill bacteria, fungi, and viruses. The E-beam is capable of producing much higher doses 
that can alter the physical properties of matter.
Examples of E-beam usage on food include military rations (MREs), food for consumption by astronauts while 
in space, and diets for pediatric cancer patients. The E-beam eliminates any possibility of contamination by 
foodborne pathogens, making it particularly useful for immunocompromised patients. E-beam exposure can also 
extend food shelf life and reduce waste, both of which are important to global food security. The E-Beam has 
proven valuable in creation of new immunization modalities by altering microorganisms during the production 
of vaccines that rely upon the use of attenuated pathogens. Once the pathogenicity of a microorganism has 
been reduced, it may be used in vaccines to produce an immune response (without harming patients) to provide 
protection against the disease caused by that pathogen. E-beam water treatment for reuse of both industrial 
and agricultural wastewater along with sludge disinfection has proven successful and issues of scalability for 
application are currently being studied.
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the crisis. A lack of resources within the country of origin 
of the outbreak makes it harder to identify the disease 
and act against it. For this reason, proper pandemic 
preparedness must include the development of field 
diagnostics that are rapid and accurate in low-resource 
environments.
Innovations in Field Diagnostics
Field diagnostics is often a weak point in pandemic 
disease and response. The importance of field 
diagnostics is most clearly demonstrated in low-resource 
countries. Places that lack refrigeration, electricity, 
and Internet access present unique challenges for 
disease responders. Further complicating the challenge 
of adequate field diagnostics is the fact that several 
low-resource countries are “hot spots” of infectious 
disease. In such places, a lack of infrastructure, disease 
knowledge, and surveillance merge with tropical 
or subtropical climates, a plethora of vectors, and 
vulnerable populations. The potential disease threat 
in these “hot spots” is one reason that the U.S. and 
countries around the world must focus the development 
of field diagnostics that are rapid and accurate in low-
resource environments.
A 2019 study by Tembo et al. stated, “The physical 
fragility of most thermocycling [a laboratory technique 
that amplifies DNA] platforms presents fundamental 
limitations for their deployment to field clinics ….” The 
authors go on to state that, despite the specificity offered 
by Polymerase Chain Reaction (PCR)-based assays (a 
laboratory technique that amplifies small segments 
of DNA), they do not transition well for the purpose of 
field diagnostics. In order to bolster diagnostics in the 
field, many scholars have promoted nanotechnology 
and other forms of biosensors, which are devices that 
convert biological responses into electronic signals 
(Chaplin, 2014). The benefits of nanotechnology include 
their simplicity, small size, and fast results (Fejzic et 
al., 2019). The most useful field diagnostics, however, 
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are those that do not require cold chain reagents, thus 
eliminating the importance of refrigeration.
There are several promising advancements in 
biosensors that could have a direct application to field 
diagnostics. These include magnetic particle-based 
sensors, peptide nucleic acid probes, and the Single 
Particle Interferometric Reflectance Imaging Sensor 
(SP-IRIS) (Tembo et al., 2019). Magnetic particle-based 
sensors bind particles to a magnetic surface, and this 
binding results in an electrical charge to the sensor 
(Koh & Josephson, 2009). Peptide nucleic acid probes 
are artificially synthesized molecules similar to DNA 
or RNA (Paulasova & Pellestor, 2004) and have allowed 
for the development of a wide array of laboratory 
tests. Finally, SP-IRIS is an optical signaling technology 
with high sensitivity in virus detection (Avci et al., 
2015). There is also a recently patented integrated 
membrane sensor capable of detecting both DNA and 
RNA (U.S. Patent # US 10,247,720 B2). The most exciting 
element of this sensor is that it has proven fast and 
effective for point-of-care screening and diagnostics. 
Nanotechnology in general and biosensors in particular 
offer a possible solution to the challenge of diagnostics 
in low-resource environments because they eliminate 
many of the factors that lead to diagnostic failure, 
such as refrigeration. Advancements such as the 
integrated membrane sensor and other nanotechnology 
developments offer an opportunity to strengthen field 
diagnostics and contain diseases at the source.
Intellectual Property Challenges in Biotechnology
The development of field diagnostics, like many other 
developments in the realm of biotechnology, is a 
lucrative business. Berger (2019) explained that “financial 
forecasts estimate the size of the global biotechnology 
market by 2021 to be between $2 and $6 billion dollars 
….” As technological advances occur more rapidly 
than ever before, biotechnology companies have an 
opportunity and a market to address challenges in 
antimicrobial resistance, diagnostics, surveillance, 
vaccines, and numerous elements of infectious disease 
response. U.S. governmental organizations like Defense 
Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) have been 
at the leading edge in tackling numerous biomedical 
challenges, but private sector companies have also 
entered the marketplace. Despite the market potential in 
the field of biotechnology, there are some obstacles still 
deterring private industry involvement. One of the most 
prominent obstacles is the theft of intellectual property.
The threat of intellectual property theft is a global 
problem, but China has been the primary violator. 
Such theft makes it more difficult to encourage private 
corporations to enter the biotechnology market and 
creates great uncertainty surrounding the protection 
of trade secrets. China is responsible for theft of 
intellectual property from the United States, both 
through the firms operating in the U.S. and U.S. firms 
operating in China (White House, 2018; National 
Counterintelligence and Security Center, 2018). Theft 
from companies and universities located in the U.S. 
occurs as a result of hacking or physical theft. Theft 
from American companies located in China is a result 
of Chinese restrictions on and control over intellectual 
property produced at those companies. Protecting 
intellectual property in the realm of biotechnology is 
vital to encouraging private sector participation in the 
development of rapid, accurate, field diagnostics.
Remote Sensing
Remote sensing provides another option for tracking 
epidemic disease outbreaks in conflict settings or in 
countries ruled by authoritarian governments. U.S. 
government satellite photography was used effectively to 
publicize the destruction of 3,800 villages in Darfur that 
had been burned to the ground by the Janjiweed militia 
in 2003-2006, a charge which the Sudanese government 
had been denying (Natsios, 2012). On March 12, 2020, 
the Washington Post published satellite photographs of 
mass graves being dug in Qom, Iran, presumably for the 
victims of the COVID-19 pandemic, which the Iranian 
government had denied had spread across the country. 
In countries with repressive governments that are trying 
to hide a disease outbreak, aerial photography could 
be used to monitor excessive activity at crematoriums, 
the digging of mass grave sites, and unusual volume 
of people going to health clinics or hospital emergency 
rooms. Such photographs could provide evidence of an 
epidemic. A similar system of aerial photography has 
been used in USAID since 1985 as part of the Famine 
Early Warning System (FEWS). FEWS was established 
after the Ethiopian famine to show warning signs of crop 
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failures that could lead to famine. Aerial photography 
is not sufficient to prove either a famine or a disease 
outbreak on a mass scale without on-the-ground 
analysis, but it can be an effective tool in alerting policy 
makers that something might be wrong.
Vaccine Innovation
Disease-causing microbial pathogens have proteins 
on their surfaces that are referred to as antigens, 
which allow the human immune system to recognize 
the pathogen and produce antibodies to kill it. In the 
majority of cases, the body can respond to both bacterial 
and viral infections, but it may take several days to 
produce antibodies following initial exposure to the 
pathogen. Once a person has encountered a pathogen, 
the immune system has the unique ability to remember 
the infectious agents’ antigenic characteristics so that 
the next time a patient is exposed to it, the body can act 
quickly to fight off the infection. This is referred to as 
developing immunity.
The concept just described may be applied to the 
production of vaccines. A vaccine essentially tricks the 
body into thinking it has been infected by the pathogen 
of interest. In some cases, infection with a similar, 
although nonlethal, organism may cause the body to 
develop antibodies that overlap and protect one from 
a serious pathogen. For example, in the past milkmaids 
who contracted cowpox – a relatively benign infection 
– developed immunity to smallpox, a deadly pathogen. 
Vaccines typically act in conjunction with the patient’s 
own immune system to protect the individual from the 
disease.
Some infectious agents, such as the human 
immunodeficiency virus (HIV) and herpes simplex, 
have proven highly problematic when attempting to 
develop a protective vaccine. This is because the HIV 
and herpes viruses actually attack the human immune 
system, preventing the production of antibodies against 
the virus. Some viruses, like influenza, mutate at an 
extremely rapid rate, which makes it difficult to develop a 
vaccine that is useful every year without having to guess 
which strain will predominate in that given year.
The importance of vaccinations as a public health tool 
cannot be overemphasized. Outbreaks of potentially 
deadly diseases, such as polio and measles, have been 
reported by the news media in recent years. Many 
of these re-emerging diseases disproportionately 
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impact children, and these outbreaks are completely 
preventable by the use of vaccines. The outbreaks in the 
U.S. are a result of vaccination rates falling below the 
levels required for herd immunity, which is the level of 
immunity within a population – a rate that varies based 
on the reproductive ratio of the diseases in question – 
that is necessary to protect individuals who are unable 
to get vaccinated. Myths about the safety of vaccines 
have led to decreased vaccination rates, which in turn 
has caused disastrous outbreaks of vaccine-preventable 
diseases.
Vaccine Production
Vaccine production occurs in several phases, the first 
of which is identification of the virus or bacterium for 
which the vaccine is to be made. During this process, 
scientists must generate the antigen used in immune 
response, which includes harvesting the pathogen itself. 
At this stage, it is still a live virus (College of Physicians of 
Philadelphia, 2020). Once the antigen is identified, it has 
to be isolated and purified. Before the final vaccine can 
be mass produced, scientists must weaken or inactivate 
the virus with a chemical or other mechanism. The 
reason that it is often most beneficial to inactivate or 
kill the pathogen is because inactivation prevents the 
vaccine from creating even a mild form of the disease it 
is designed to prevent, and it can be given to people with 
weakened immune systems (Offit, 2019).
Small quantities of a vaccine may be produced in a 
laboratory setting. Scaling up to produce or manufacture 
millions of vaccine doses is not a simple process and 
requires very specialized equipment. Consideration 
must be given to how the vaccine will be administered 
– i.e., by injection, oral administration, or inhalation – in 
order to produce a vaccine with the correct physical 
characteristics. The federal government has sponsored 
the construction of several facilities across the country, 
including here at Texas A&M University, equipped to 
produce approximately 50 million doses of an approved 
vaccine within three months, if called upon to do so. 
These facilities also have the laboratory capabilities for 
the creation of new vaccines.
Once large quantities of a vaccine have been produced 
and packaged under sterile conditions, they are 
ready for dissemination. At this stage of the process, 
considerations must be made for the potential necessity 
of maintaining vaccine viability through the cold chain. 
Failure to keep vaccines cold during the transportation 
process can significantly reduce or eliminate their 
effectiveness upon administration. This is a particularly 
15
Fourth Annual White Paper • May 2020
in the Age of Technology
relevant challenge in low-income countries without 
reliable electricity or refrigeration. Finding solutions 
to cold chain problems is important for creating more 
effective pandemic preparedness and response.
Vaccine Development Timelines
Vaccines are a vital tool in preventing outbreaks of 
infectious disease. Vaccines create immunity in a 
population, which prevents diseases from taking hold. 
They have also been an indispensable tool in disease 
eradication campaigns, such as in the campaign 
to eradicate smallpox. When a vaccine is available, 
utilization of that vaccine can prevent a pandemic from 
occurring. Unfortunately, most pandemics are the result 
of emerging diseases, such as SARS, 2009 H1N1, or SARS-
CoV-2. In these cases, vaccines were not available at the 
time of the outbreak and had to be developed after the 
fact.
PHAGES
Patients with infections that are very difficult or impossible to treat due to antibiotic/antimicrobial resistance (AR/
AMR) are presenting at an increasing rate. Penicillin was discovered and utilized prior to World War II, but it did 
not become widely available until 1945. Since that time antibiotics have proven less and less effective at killing 
pathogenic microorganisms. This includes newer antibiotics such as Vancomycin and Methicillin. When used 
to treat Vancomycin-resistant Enterococci (VRE) and Methicillin-resistant Staphylococcus aureus (MRSA), along 
with many other resistant bacteria, patients are at risk of succumbing to their infections. These microorganisms 
are often referred to as “Superbugs” and their lack of response to antibiotics presents a global health problem. 
Not only have the microorganisms evolved mechanisms to become antibiotic resistant, they can transfer this 
resistance characteristic to other bacteria. The United Nations Ad Hoc Interagency Coordinating Group on 
Antimicrobial Resistance predicts 10 million people will die annually from AMR infections by 2050, if no action is 
taken.
It is well known that there are many deadly viruses that can infect humans. In the early twentieth century, British 
and German scientists discovered that viruses can attack and kill bacteria. Other viruses infect bacteria but do not 
kill them, rather they integrate into the bacterial genome in order to replicate additional viruses. A virus that kills 
bacteria is called a bacteriophage or just “phage” (from the Greek word “to devour”). The concept was proposed 
that the bacteria-killing phage could be used alone or in conjunction with traditional antibiotics to treat human 
patients with AR/AMR infections. Both RNA-based and DNA-based bacteriophages have been discovered and are 
much more specific as to the bacteria they kill than the antibiotics typically used to treat patients. Importantly, 
phages do not attack human cells and are typically harmless to beneficial bacteria, such as those found in our 
gastrointestinal system. Synthetic biology or gene editing may be used to increase the specificity of a phage for a 
“specific bacteria” infecting a “specific patent”. This is referred to as “precision medicine”.
Dr. Ry Young of Texas A&M University heads the Center for Phage Technology. This center conducts research on 
identifying phages that are lethal to specific pathogens. Once identified, issues associated with producing the 
virus, storage, administration, and FDA approval for use of the phage must be pursued. Tremendous progress 
is being made. In 2016, a patient in California was fighting for his life from an antibiotic resistant Acinetobacter 
baumannii infection. Permission was sought and received under the special emergency/compassionate use 
guidelines to treat the patient with a phage designed to kill the bacterium. Within 48 hours of administering the 
phage to the patient, he regained consciousness and began to recover. This incredible example of how a phage 
can be used to kill AR/AMR organisms in humans opens a new world of medical promise for control of bacterial 
pathogens.
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In instances where vaccines must be developed in the 
midst of an outbreak, the public health community 
and the general population should expect lengthy 
delays between the first stages of research and the 
dissemination of a finalized vaccine. This delay is the 
result of scientific development and discovery as well as 
the clinical trials process to make sure that the vaccine 
will be safe for use in humans. According to the WHO, 
it takes approximately six months for a new vaccine for 
pandemic influenza to become available once the virus 
is identified (WHO, 2009). In the ongoing outbreak of 
SARS-CoV-2 (the COVID-19 pandemic), the timeline for 
developing and approving a vaccine is predicted to be 
12 to 18 months (Soucheray, 2020), though this process 
could take much longer. For diseases in which we have 
no precedent, for example the SARS virus in 2003, 
vaccine development can take years. Thus, vaccines are 
important to public health protection and pandemic 
response, but they do not always provide a rapid disease 
containment option.
RECOMMENDATIONS:
1) Create an integrated surveillance system for 
infectious disease – Pandemic Early Warning 
System (PEWS).
To create more robust infectious disease surveillance, 
which allows for a higher likelihood of containment at 
the source, we recommend developing an integrated 
surveillance network that utilizes mobile data, web-
based data, GIS data, and scientific databases like the 
one created by the PREDICT program. This surveillance 
network, which we have named Pandemic Early Warning 
System (PEWS), would provide a multi-tiered approach 
to disease surveillance. Collecting surveillance data from 
varying sources that are not reliant on self-reporting 
can speed up the time to recognition of an outbreak 
and lessen the chances of a pandemic. Even if such a 
system is set up in an international body, a parallel but 
independent system should be developed by the U.S. 
17
Fourth Annual White Paper • May 2020
in the Age of Technology
government to ensure alternate sources of information 
if the international system fails or vice versa. Redundant 
early warning systems are needed to protect the 
integrity of data capture and analysis. Politics often 
intervenes to distort facts in a crisis.
In addition, an epidemic response system should 
be created within the US government that does not 
require high level authorization to initiate a disease 
outbreak containment response. We have an existing 
and historically successful model for doing this for 
other natural disasters in USAID’s Office of Foreign 
Disaster Assistance (OFDA), which can mobilize a 
Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART) within 48 
hours to travel to remote locations in the world to 
begin a humanitarian response. These DART teams 
are expeditionary (i.e., they are self-contained and 
self-supporting), flexible in size, have authorization to 
spend money without going through the lengthy U.S. 
government procurement process (from which they 
are exempt under the notwithstanding clause in their 
enabling legislation), and have access to unencumbered 
financial resources. DART teams may be mobilized with 
no more than the approval of the U.S. Ambassador to 
the country receiving assistance and the OFDA office 
director. OFDA had a budget of $1.7 billion in 2019 and 
more than 700 staff.
The greatest enemy of disaster response is time. 
Thus, any pandemic early warning system should be 
organizationally linked to a rapid response team at the 
lowest level of the federal government to avoid invariable 
bureaucratic delays up the chain of command.
2) Expand research and development into 
promising biosensors.
Biosensors have proven useful in creating rapid 
diagnostics in low-resource settings, but there is still 
a long way to go before we have solved the problem 
of disease detection in such settings. Thus, we must 
continue to support research and development efforts 
in biosensor technology. This technology provides the 
best opportunity for rapid diagnostics in high-risk, low-
resources settings and can prove valuable in containing 
an outbreak before it becomes a pandemic.
3) Develop more efficient vaccine dissemination 
plans.
As a country, we are constantly working to improve 
our vaccine dissemination plans. Each new presidential 
administration develops priorities for who will be the 
first in society to receive vaccines. For example, will 
it be the military, healthcare workers, transportation 
workers, or the most vulnerable in society? However, 
dissemination to those individuals, once vaccines 
are available, is an ongoing challenge that requires 
the resources of both the public and private sectors. 
Investigating how we can use companies, such as UPS 
and FedEx, to move vaccines around the country is an 
important component in developing an effective vaccine 
dissemination policy.
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CRISPR
Clustered Regularly Interspaced Short Palindromic 
Repeats (CRISPR) is a segment of DNA that is involved in 
defense against viruses. Over the last decade, scientists 
have developed tools that can use CRISPR to modify 
genes. The development and use of CRISPR-based 
techniques for genetic engineering have increased since 
they first showed effectiveness in the cells of mammals 
in 2013 (Cong et al. 2013). Such strategies have significant 
implications for scientific research, medicine, agriculture, 
and manufacturing, because they offer affordable and 
accessible ways to make targeted genetic changes. Since 
2013, CRISPR has been commercialized and is now used 
in laboratories around the world.
Until the introduction of CRISPR, the major limitation 
blocking the development and use of genetic engineering 
was the lack of an effective and accessible means of 
editing DNA. Following the development of CRISPR 
technology, however, all of that changed.
Seemingly overnight, CRISPR and its associated Cas 
proteins provided a cheap and relatively easy way to 
“cut and paste” genetic changes. This was revolutionary, 
because producing custom RNA sequences is orders of 
magnitude cheaper than producing custom proteins. 
Additionally, the Cas proteins, particularly Cas9, are 
inexpensive and available commercially. Because of the 
accessibility and standardized nature of CRISPR/Cas, it 
can quickly be adapted to a variety of gene modifications 
in a variety of organisms. By 2014, approximately one 
year after the first publication of its use for genome 
engineering, researchers had demonstrated that CRISPR/
Cas9 could be used for gene editing in human, mouse, 
TOPIC AREA 2: DUAL USE RESEARCH OF CONCERN
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rat, fruit fly, nematode, salamander, frog, rice, wheat, 
sorghum, and tobacco cells, among others (Doudna and 
Charpentier, 2014). Additionally, the originally published 
CRISPR/Cas system continues to be improved and 
adapted to new uses. For example, it has been found 
that a new Cas protein (i.e., Cas13) can be used in editing 
RNA, which makes up the genome of many viruses 
(Abudayyeh et al., 2017).
RAMAN SPECTROSCOPY
Raman spectroscopy is an analytical tool used to determine the chemical bonds present in a sample of material. 
These chemical bonds are uniquely related to the identification of the sample. When a sample is exposed to a high 
intensity laser, light is scattered in two different forms, including (1) Rayleigh scatter that is at the same wavelength 
as the incident laser and (2) Raman scatter that is at different wavelengths and is unique to the sample’s chemical 
structure but at a much lower signal strength. Texas A&M University’s research into Raman spectroscopy is 
carried out in the Dwight Look College of Engineering and the College of AgriLife Sciences. Our Institute for 
Quantum Science and Engineering is led by Dr. Martin Scully, who is working closely with investigators at Princeton 
University.
Raman spectroscopy has been used for some years in the physical sciences for the detection of explosives and 
other inorganic compounds and is available in hand-held units. In recent years Raman spectroscopy has been 
utilized for the culture-free identification of microbial pathogens. Samples of infectious agents typically would 
have to be cultured from patients and allowed to grow in a laboratory setting until sufficient numbers were 
available to provide an accurate identification. Unfortunately, during the time it might take to grow the culture, 
the patient might succumb to the infection. Raman spectroscopy allows for the rapid identification of pathogens 
resulting in the timely initiation of appropriate therapeutic interventions.
Following the 9/11 attacks and in conjunction with the United States Postal Service, researchers here at Texas 
A&M University (TAMU) refined Raman spectroscopy for the detection of pathogenic microorganisms contained 
in letters. Multiple cases of inhalation anthrax, including five deaths, resulted from this USPS attack and method 
of disease propagation. The TAMU research focused on the detection of Bacillus anthracis (the agent responsible 
for anthrax and used in the attacks) directly through an envelope containing the microbial spores. This technique 
is currently in use and alerts officials of danger before having to open potentially lethal envelopes containing and 
spreading inhalation anthrax.
Efforts are currently underway to further develop the concept of “Standoff Raman spectroscopy”. This technique 
addresses the concept of being able to use Raman spectroscopy from further and further distances from the 
object being analyzed (millimeters to kilometers). Two approaches for utilizing standoff Raman spectroscopy 
are being investigated. The first technique focuses on detection of pollutants, poison gases, and microbes with 
a ground-based laser directed into the atmosphere. The second technique extends use to a drone that could be 
flown over crops or herds of animals to evaluate potential infections from a variety of pathogenic agents. Research 
at TAMU also continues on batteries to provide sufficient power to the Raman laser at a weight acceptable for use 
in drones.
There are many advantages to the development of 
CRISPR/Cas, but likely the most valuable has been in 
the biomedical and biopharmaceutical industry. In 
addition to the design, testing, and manufacture of new 
therapeutic drugs, CRISPR/Cas itself can improve human 
health. Recently, CRISPR/Cas was directly applied in a 
human patient for the first time to correct a degenerative 
genetic vision disorder (White, 2020). Gene and cell 
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therapies using CRISPR/Cas have the potential to treat 
cancer, cardiovascular disease, metabolic diseases, 
neurodegenerative diseases, viral diseases, hereditary 
eye diseases, blood diseases (Li et al., 2020) and to target 
human immune cells to fight tumors (Eyquem et al., 2017; 
Jung and Lee, 2018; Hu et al., 2019).
However, CRISPR/Cas also comes with risks. While 
there is potential to use genome editing to cure genetic 
diseases, many have worried about its use for creating 
bioweapons or new diseases. As an example of this 
concern, a team of Canadian researchers published 
their method of constructing the extinct horsepox virus 
using synthetic biology techniques in 2018 (Noyce et 
al., 2018). Thus, the national security and global health 
communities must come to agreement on the use and 
monitoring of CRISPR technologies.
Promises and Perils
Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) refers to life 
sciences research that could pose a threat to public 
health and safety, agriculture, the environment, or 
national security. Dual-use research topics walk the line 
between serving as a driver of innovation and a national 
security threat. On the one hand, if we aspire to move 
to the next steps in modern technological advances in 
the life sciences, cutting edge research must be pursued. 
On the other, we must use established frameworks to 
determine the risk associated with research that is being 
proposed. The U.S. must understand that any decisions 
to limit research on specific topics or those using select 
agents could cost American interests in the long run 
as other nations may not hold the same reservations. 
The readily available information on the internet 
and in the public domain has lowered the barriers to 
entry for people across the world. The proliferation of 
information, knowledge, and skills has only moved the 
timeline forward on many dual-use research topics. 
Stakeholders must be aware of both the promises and 
perils associated with Dual Use Research of Concern.
Promises of Technological Development in the 
Biological Sciences
Innovations spawned by Dual Use Research of Concern 
have the potential to save lives in the future while 
raising the quality of life for many in the near term. 
Current advances using CRISPR Cas9 and Cas13 may 
eventually lead to the eradication of some of humanity’s 
most debilitating genetic diseases. It is important for 
research related to such conditions as Huntington's 
disease, muscular dystrophy, HIV/AIDs, and cancers, 
among others, to continue to be pursued. With current 
technological advancements, scientists are finding ways 
to use gene editing to “attack” infected cells to remove 
HIV from an individual (Khalili et al., 2017). This type 
of research could change the world as we know it if it 
is successful in eliminating HIV/AIDS. Advancements 
currently underway offer to people all over the world 
the potential to be free from painful, chronic, or life-
shortening diseases. Because of this, it is important 
that the U.S. continue to allow work that may lead to 
such developments and implement proper vetting and 
review of projects to decrease the likelihood that such 
work would be used for nefarious purposes. Through 
responsible oversight and review of dual-use scientific 
research efforts, we can allow for scientific innovation 
while expanding all hazards preparations to mitigate any 
adverse cascading effects from misuse.
Perils of Technological Development in the 
Biological Sciences
While Dual Use Research of Concern offers many 
promises, it could also lead to novel threats from 
practices, methods, and materials that may initially 
appear benign. The risk of bioterrorism from Dual Use 
Research of Concern is present, even if the likelihood 
is slim. Arguably there has been a normalization of 
the use of chemical agents across the world with 
little repercussions. Below, we outline a scenario that 
demonstrates how quickly work done for scientific 
advancement can be transitioned and implemented in a 
harmful manner.
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Existing Laws and Regulations
To date, the regulatory statutes surrounding Dual 
Use Research of Concern have lacked clarity. The Fink 
Report, produced in 2004, supplied recommendations 
for Dual Use Research of Concern oversights and 
supported the formation of the National Science 
Advisory Board for Biosecurity (NSABB) (Tomlinson, 
2018; National Academies, 2017; National Advisory 
Board for Biosecurity, 2007; National Research Council, 
2004). These recommendations, which included 
BIOTERROR SCENARIO: TERRORIST WEAPONIZATION OF BACILLUS 
ANTHRACIS HARVESTED FROM RANCHLANDS
In the western U.S., an outlier political faction supported by wealthy benefactors has slowly increased their 
membership and political activity. They have a private cattle ranch secluded from traditional society. The faction 
is a driver of much of the local ranching economy and employs members of the community on their cattle 
operation. The faction has supported local candidates for office and has influence throughout the region. Local law 
enforcement gives them a wide berth. All of their political donations and community improvements have bought 
them loyalty from county and state officials. At some point, disagreement emerges between the faction and a 
lawmaker in the capital of their state. The faction leaders have already expressed interest in the use of chemical 
and biological agents in a manner similar to the poisoning of Sergei and Yulia Skripal in the United Kingdom 
(OPCW, 2018), the Aleph doomsday cult in Japan (Olson, 1999), and the Rajneeshee salmonella attack in Oregon 
(Torok et al., 1997). They believe that the answer to their political problems is to make a statement and to eliminate 
their opponents in the state legislature.
The determination is made to use something that has been found to kill their cattle: Anthrax. They discovered 
the deposit on the ranch after a local veterinarian was called to do a necropsy on a few head of cattle that died 
unexpectedly. Once the decision is made, the faction begins diverting funds into creating a laboratory on their 
compound to weaponize anthrax and to recruit scientists aligned with their cause. Their unlimited funding and 
off-the-grid lifestyle help them stay under the radar as they operate their private laboratory. The faction harvests 
anthrax on their ranch and begins using research in the public domain to assist in weaponizing the agent. The 
research work takes time, but the faction is well-funded and patient. Faction scientists are successful and test their 
agent on livestock before moving to the next step of deploying the weaponized anthrax.
Once they are ready to carry out their attack, three faction members enter the state capitol building, don 
protective equipment, and throw aerosolized canisters to disperse highly concentrated amounts of the agent into 
the chambers where members of the legislature are meeting. Members are confused and initially believe that 
the fumes coming from the canisters are botched tear gas grenades. Due to this misunderstanding, they do not 
initially flee. The faction members leave and bar the chamber doors behind them, leaving the members for dead.
A scenario like the one described here may seem unlikely, but it is possible. Information, ideology, and methods 
can move at the speed of light across the globe due to the Internet and the growing connectivity it allows. If 
determined individuals have the funds and access, they could strive to use Dual Use Research of Concern for 
malicious purposes. Stakeholders in the life sciences and national security community must understand the 
nature of the promises and perils of Dual Use Research of Concern. By acknowledging the risk, working toward 
better active surveillance, proper vetting, education, and other national security steps, the U.S. can lead the world 
in pursuing Dual Use Research of Concern responsibly, while also maintaining vigilance for potential misuse.
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implementation of a review process at both the project 
planning and publication stage, provide multiple places 
where officials can identify scientific processes that may 
pose a threat to national security. Lastly, the Fink Report 
acknowledged that Dual Use Research of Concern was 
an international problem and that there was a need for 
international cooperation.
On the international level, the 2000 Cartagena 
Protocol and the Nagoya Protocol both provided 
provisions regarding genetic engineering research 
(Tomlinson, 2018). The Australian Group also serves 
as an international guiding body and tracks dual-use 
technologies and agents through a common control 
list (National Academies of Sciences, Engineering, 
and Medicine, Policy and Global Affairs; Committee 
on Science, Technology, 2017). Ultimately, the NSABB, 
which was formed in 2012, has supplied the frameworks 
and guidance for Dual Use Research of Concern in 
combination with a 2012 National Institutes of Health 
policy that provides additional oversights for life sciences 
involving Dual Use Research of Concern (National 
Academies, 2017). The two main policies that the federal 
government has created at the recommendation of the 
NSABB are requiring both federal funding agencies and 
federally-funded research institutions (1) to identify 
Dual Use Research of Concern and (2) to take action to 
reduce the risk (Wolinetz, 2017). It should be noted that 
institutions that do not receive federal funding are not 
subject to oversight.
What does Dual Use Research of Concern 
Mean for Pandemics?
The paradox of the necessity for Dual Use Research of 
Concern is especially evident in the area of pandemic 
preparedness. The world is dealing with one of the 
greatest global challenges in modern history, namely, the 
COVID-19 pandemic. The exponential spread of COVID-19 
across the globe has frozen commerce, overwhelmed 
healthcare systems, and will likely change the world 
as we know it (CDC, 2020; Sohrabi et. al, 2020). The 
state of the planet today illustrates both the necessity 
for pandemic research and the very real concern for 
its potential danger if applied to the development 
of bioweaponry. To fully appreciate the scope of the 
challenge, both the benefits to humanity through 
pandemic research and the dangers of the misuse of 
such research need to be appreciated.
CDC Guidelines on Infectious Disease Dual Use 
Research of Concern
There exist 15 select agents on which the CDC considers 
research to be dual-use. These include, among others, 
highly pathogenic avian influenza viruses, Bacillus 
anthracis (anthrax), Ebola virus, and Variola major 
(smallpox) (CDC, 2020). Furthermore, the aim of the 
research done with these and other agents could be 
dual-use. As listed in the CDC Dual Use Research of 
Concern Avian Flu press release (2019), such research of 
concern includes efforts to achieve the following:
1.  Enhance the harmful consequences of the agent or 
toxin;
2.  Disrupt immunity or the effectiveness of an 
immunization against the agent or toxin without 
clinical and/or agricultural justification;
3.  Confer on the agent or toxin resistance to clinically 
and/or agriculturally useful preventative or 
treatment interventions against that agent or 
toxin, or facilitate their ability to evade methods of 
detection;
4.  Increase the stability, transmissibility, or ability to 
disseminate the agent or toxin;
5.  Alter the host range or tropism of the agent or 
toxin;
6.  Enhance the susceptibility of a host population to 
the agent or toxin; and
7.  Generate or reconstitute an eradicated or extinct 
agent or one of the 15 Dual Use Research of 
Concern toxins or agents.
Research conducted with these agents makes it critical 
for the global health effort to be prepared for potential 
natural pandemics or biological warfare, but the 
applications of this research must be closely monitored 
and the methods scrutinized in order to assure public 
safety and national security. Misappropriation of 
research on these agents could be disastrous.
Synthetic Biology and the Cheapening of Biological 
Dual Use Research of Concern
The widespread availability and adoption of synthetic 
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biology technology have exacerbated the concerns 
about the misappropriation of pandemic and infectious 
agent research. Synthetic biology is an emerging 
field of research that applies engineering practices to 
biology. Evolving research in this area lessens the effort 
required to manipulate DNA and potentially allows for 
the creation of novel infectious agents or enhanced 
virulence of existing infectious agents. For example, it is 
conceivable that someone with access to the appropriate 
lab equipment and a strain of an infectious agent, such 
as anthrax, could manipulate the DNA of their infectious 
strain to make the pathogen hardier, or airborne, 
or target populations of people with specific ethnic 
backgrounds. Furthermore, experiments conducted 
with synthetic biology on infectious agents, whether 
by amateurs or legitimate research institutions, have 
the potential for mishap, possibly leaking dangerous 
manufactured pathogens into the outside world. 
Finally, while the vast majority of legitimate research 
conducted with synthetic biology produces enormous 
gains in the fields of medicine, agricultural science, and 
environmental science, off-target effects in synthetic 
biology pandemic research could lead to unforeseen 
public health dangers.
Gain-of-Function Research: Implications for 
Pandemics
Even without the aid of synthetic biology, research 
on infectious pathogens has the potential for misuse 
and is a matter of concern for regulatory agencies and 
research ethicists. Most notably, in 2014, the Obama 
administration called for a freeze in government funding 
for gain-of-function research (Selgelid, 2016). Gain-of-
function research aims to increase the transmissibility 
or virulence of a pathogen. Understandably, the 
administration was concerned that this sort of 
experiment could lead to a highly infectious agent with 
the potential to create a pandemic. However, it must 
be understood that research in this arena is critical to 
understanding the nature of pathogens and predicting 
how they may behave in certain environments. In this 
way, gain-of-function research can be both a public 
health threat and a necessary means to protect the 
public.
At the time of this publication, concerns over the use 
of synthetic biology as an instrument for bioterrorism 
are yet to be validated. However, thoughtful legislation 
and preparedness could prevent catastrophe. Effective 
measures to prevent misuse of pandemic research 
could include continued scrutiny of research that 
utilizes any pathogen in the CDC’s list of select agents 
or involves research practices that fall under the CDC’s 
list of dual-use experiments (CDC, 2019). In this vein, 
an international body of experts on infectious disease 
research is recommended to provide guidance on 
which experiments are and are not necessary and the 
appropriate way to conduct the ones that are (Fauci 
& Collins, 2012). Finally, involving civil society early in 
the discourse on research plans will provide a public 
perspective for the discussion (Fadden & Karron 2012).
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RECOMMENDATIONS:
1) Continue communication between federal law 
enforcement and both the amateur and professional 
scientific community to strengthen biosecurity 
understanding and processes.
When DIY bio laboratories began to increase in 
popularity, the FBI actively sought to build relationships 
with amateur scientists working in those labs. The 
purpose of establishing these relationships was to 
provide the FBI with knowledge regarding what type 
of science was being conducted, but it also served to 
build a relationship between DIY biohackers and the 
law enforcement agency with the hope that people 
would feel more comfortable reporting any suspicious 
experiments. Continuing to build and strengthen these 
relationships as well as extending the relationships into 
formalized science (i.e., academic institutes, research 
centers, and the private sector) would help scientists 
look beyond the science and better understand the 
possible national security implications of their work.
2) Create an international body of experts to review 
experiments.
An international body of infectious disease experts 
should be created to review Dual Use Research of 
Concern from around the world. This panel will set 
standards and provide recommendations for the global 
community to help countries find a balance between 
scientific innovation and national security.
3) Continue to strengthen policies and protocols for 
reviewing the funding and publication of Dual Use of 
Research Concern.
The Fink Report and the formation of the NSABB were 
important steps toward increasing safety around Dual 
Use Research of Concern, but there is still work that 
needs to be done. In particular, regulations and oversight 
apply almost exclusively to federally-funded research. 
This leaves a significant gap in national security oversight 
and pandemic preparedness. If terrorist organizations 
or individuals are able to secure private funding for their 
work, there is limited action that the federal government 
is able to take with regards to regulation of research or 
even knowledge that such research is happening.
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What is the Bioeconomy?
The Global Bioeconomy Summit (2018) defines the 
bioeconomy as “the production, utilization and 
conservation of biological resources, including related 
knowledge, science, technology, and innovation, to 
provide information, products, processes and services 
across all economic sectors aiming toward a sustainable 
economy” (FAO, 2020). On paper, the use of biological 
resources, whether that be knowledge or technology, 
is considered part of the bioeconomy. In practice, this 
means that everything from pharmaceuticals to the 
food on grocery store shelves are important concerns 
for biosecurity. In a U.S. Senate hearing held on March 
3, 2020, Dr. Jason Kelly from Ginkgo Bioworks noted that 
as the ability to produce things using synthetic biology 
is increasing, the cost of this production is decreasing 
(U.S. Senate, 2020). In other words, knowledge and 
technologies that are at the core of the bioeconomy are 
becoming easier and more accessible. While there are 
numerous positive aspects of the bioeconomy, “…the 
powerful technologies encompassed by the bioeconomy 
can also lead to national security and economic 
vulnerabilities” (National Academies of Sciences, 
2020). The growing importance of such knowledge and 
technologies is the primary reason that the U.S. must 
focus on the physical and economic impacts of the 
bioeconomy domestically and abroad.
Why Does the Bioeconomy Matter?
In our February 11, 2020, article in The Conversation 
titled “The silent threat of the coronavirus: America’s 
dependence on Chinese pharmaceuticals,” we discussed 
TOPIC AREA 3: THE BIOECONOMY
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the dangerous nature of America’s reliance on China 
for the production of active ingredients and finished 
pharmaceutical products. Eighty percent of our 
pharmaceuticals are produced in China, and for some 
medications China produces almost 100 percent of the 
active ingredients (Blackburn et al., 2020; Gibson & Singh, 
2018). A near-monopoly on the pharmaceutical market 
gives the Chinese government unprecedented power 
over the health and safety of Americans. Additionally, the 
COVID-19 pandemic is demonstrating the possible impact 
of disease on the medical supply chain: When China 
nationalized factories producing masks, the U.S. quickly 
found itself with a shortage (Bradsher & Alderman, 
2020). Imagine the impact if shortages were to occur with 
medicines necessary to keep people alive, such as cancer 
treatment drugs or insulin.
The bioeconomy also matters for reasons outside of 
pharmaceuticals. Developments in synthetic biology, 
genetic information (such as 23andMe, Inc.), and vaccine 
development are all vital components of the growing 
bioeconomy. As artificial intelligence increases, the ways 
in which we will be able to use biological information will 
expand. Control over and protection of biological data 
will play a substantial role in the health and well-being of 
countries around the globe.
National Security Issues within the Bioeconomy
A 2020 report from the National Academy of Sciences 
lists several economic and national security risks that 
exist in the realm of the bioeconomy. Among these risks 
are the failure of the U.S. to promote the bioeconomy 
domestically, which has resulted in “diminished U.S. 
scientific leadership in the global bioeconomy,” and a 
failure to protect the U.S. bioeconomy from intentional 
acts that could result in harm or misuse. Regarding the 
loss of scientific leadership, the report charges that there 
has been insufficient support for vital research, and this 
lack of investment could have long-term detrimental 
impacts on the ability of the U.S. to act as a leader in 
the scientific community. The report also acknowledges 
asymmetric research constraints that often limit the 
types of experiments American scientists can conduct.
Regarding the failure to protect the bioeconomy from 
intentional acts of harm and misuse, the report points 
out numerous concerns, including genetic targeting of 
populations. Genetic weapons could be developed, the 
report argues, that would have “the ability to attack 
a specific individual or group of individuals on the 
basis of distinctive genetic traits” (National Academies, 
2020, p. 298). This is just one of many examples that 
illustrate the ways that information in the bioeconomy 
could be misused, but it can clearly demonstrate why 
understanding and safeguarding the bioeconomy are 
vital to U.S. interests.
Coronavirus Outbreak and Data Ownership
The ongoing COVID-19 pandemic has demonstrated 
in more ways than one why the U.S. needs to turn its 
attention to the bioeconomy. As mentioned above, 
our reliance on pharmaceuticals from China puts us 
in a dangerous situation in the event of a pandemic or 
any other natural or human-made event that would 
prevent China from continuing to supply the necessary 
medicines and medical equipment to the U.S. The 
pandemic has also demonstrated the importance of 
data ownership as seen when China shared the SARS-
CoV-2 genome (digitally), but did not share the actual 
samples. This may seem like a small distinction, but it has 
large implications for the ability of the U.S. to produce 
a vaccine for COVID-19. Without physical samples, the 
U.S. was unable to gather any information about the 
virus/host interaction. By sharing only portions of the 
genetic information, the Chinese government is able to 
ensure that the U.S. remains at a disadvantage in the 
development of vaccines and treatments.
There are numerous examples of how the U.S. is falling 
behind in the bioeconomy. What have been touched on 
in this section are just two specific examples that have 
come to light as a result of COVID-19. During our Fall 
2020 Annual Pandemic Policy Summit, the Scowcroft 
Institute will explore the bioeconomy in more detail and 
work toward developing policy solutions for some of the 
most pressing problems.
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INFRASTRUCTURE
In order to conduct cutting-edge research critical to national security, state-of-the-art research facilities are 
required. Texas A&M University in conjunction with both State of Texas and U.S. governmental agencies has 
constructed and equipped the following biosecurity research facilities:
National Center for Therapeutics Manufacturing (NCTM). The NCTM is a 156,000 square-foot interdisciplinary 
research and workforce education center that serves the global biopharmaceutical and vaccine manufacturing 
industries. The NCTM operates as a dedicated vaccine facility that is capable of manufacturing vaccines for 
seasonal influenza strains as well as other approved vaccines, such as for coronavirus. The NCTM also develops 
hands-on learning experiences to train scientists and technicians to develop new medicines to deal with 
tomorrow’s public health challenges. When at maximum surge capacity, the center contributes to the country’s 
pandemic response by being able to produce 50 million doses of an approved vaccine within three months for the 
federal government.
Texas A&M Institute for Preclinical Studies (TIPS). TIPS provides large animal translational research studies as well 
as access to expertise in all major medical and scientific disciplines, such as surgery engineering, nephrology, 
and pathology, among others. TIPS is fully capable of providing preclinical (safety and efficacy) Food and Drug 
Administration-required testing of both biomedical devices and pharmaceuticals. The 112,000 square-foot facility 
maintains 240 individual large animal housing units with good laboratory practice compliance, three 600 square-
foot surgical suites, and all state-of-the-art imaging modalities. Conference facilities complete with auditoriums for 
teaching and training are located within the facility.
Texas A&M Institute for Genomic Medicine (TIGM). TIGM has one of the largest libraries of embryonic cells in 
multiple mice strains in the world as well as transgenic services, such as CRISPR/Cas9-based genome modification. 
In addition, TIGM houses on site molecular biology and tissue culture facilities as well as laboratories for 
microinjecting stem cells and cryopreservation of stem cells, embryos, and sperm.
Global Health Research Complex (GHRC). The GHRC is a Biosafety Level 3 agriculture containment facility and is 
one of only a couple of such complexes capable of conducting world class global health research on higher level 
pathogens. This 130,000 square-foot facility provides new and innovative methods for monitoring, detecting, 
and preventing emerging zoonotic infectious diseases that pose the greatest threat to the world’s public health 
and agricultural food supply. The GHRC supports global health through new technologies in the development of 
vaccines, diagnostics, and modes of transmission utilizing its state-of-the-art large animal facilities, laboratories, 
and insect vector housing.
Disaster City. This 52-acre training facility is designed to simulate disasters ranging from natural occurrences, 
such as earthquakes to terrorist attacks using bioweapons. Disaster City allows training for emergency response 
professionals in a variety of scenarios. The facility has collapsible building structures designed to mimic different 
types of emergencies. First responders from around the world travel to TAMU to experience the best training and 
exercises in the most realistic disaster settings. Training exercises can be designed to be conducted in full Personal 
Protective Equipment (PPE) for biological, chemical, and/or nuclear exposures.
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Government. He served in the United States Army from 1967 through 1969. He began his 
academic career as a microbiologist working with various infectious agents and their impact 
on mammalian Physiology.
Dr. Laine expanded his graduate education into biophysics and biomedical engineering by applying basic principles 
of physical science to complex medical problems. He spent a decade in a clinical department of anesthesiology and 
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critical care medicine in the Texas Medical Center before returning to Texas A&M as Department Head of Physiology, 
Pharmacology and Toxicology for 20 years. Dr. Laine served as the Vice President for Research at Texas A&M leading 
unprecedented growth in research expenditures to just under one billion dollars per year.  As Vice President, he 
initiated the design and construction of the Biosafety Level-3 AG biocontainment facility. This facility accommodates 
the chronic study of high consequence infectious diseases along with the vectors responsible for transmission of 
disease in animals and humans.
Andrew Natsios
Andrew S. Natsios is an executive professor at the Bush School and director of the Scowcroft 
Institute of International Affairs. Natsios was most recently a Distinguished Professor in the 
Practice of Diplomacy at the Walsh School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University and 
former administrator of the US Agency for International Development (USAID). As USAID 
administrator from 2001-2006, Natsios managed reconstruction programs in Afghanistan, 
Iraq, and Sudan. He also served as US special envoy to Sudan in 2006-2007. Retired from 
the US Army Reserves at the rank of lieutenant colonel after twenty-three years, Natsios 
is a veteran of the Gulf War. From 1993 to 1998, he was vice president of World Vision US, 
the largest faith-based nongovernmental organization in the world, with programs in 103 countries. Earlier in his 
career, Natsios served in the Massachusetts House of Representatives for twelve years and as the chief financial 
and administrative officer of the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. He also served as the CEO of Boston's Big Dig, 
the largest construction project in American history, after a cost overrun scandal.  He is the author of three books: 
U.S. Foreign Policy and the Four Horsemen of the Apocalypse (1997); The Great North Korean Famine (2001); and his latest 
book, Sudan, South Sudan and Darfur: What Everyone Needs to Know, published in 2012 by Oxford University Press. He 
has contributed to thirteen other books. He has published numerous articles in Foreign Affairs, the New York Times, 
Washington Post, Washington Quarterly, Foreign Service Journal, and Wall Street Journal.
Gerald W. Parker, DVM, PhD
Gerald W. Parker Jr., DVM, PhD Dr. Parker is a Senior Fellow for the Pandemic and Biosecurity 
Policy Programs at the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs, Bush School of Government 
and Public Service; Associate Dean for Global One Health, Texas A&M College of Veterinary 
Medicine; and Strategic Advisor for the Institute for Infectious Animal Diseases at Texas A&M 
AgriLife Research. Dr. Parker also serves on several advisory boards, including the National 
Academies of Sciences, Engineering, and Medicine standing committee on Health Threats and 
Workforce Resilience; the FEMA National Advisory Council; the Homeland Security Science 
and Technology Advisory Committee; the Biodefense Blue Ribbon Panel; and the Texas Task 
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Force on Emerging Infectious Disease Preparedness and Response. Prior to his appointment to Texas A&M University, 
Dr. Parker held technical to executive leadership positions throughout thirty-six years of public service. He is a former 
Commander and Deputy Commander, US Army Medical Research Institute of Infectious Diseases. Dr. Parker held 
senior executive-level positions at the Department of Homeland Security, the Department of Health and Human 
Services (HHS), and the Department of Defense (DOD), including serving as the Principal Deputy Assistant Secretary 
for Preparedness and Response at HHS and Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Chemical and Biological 
Defense at DOD. Dr. Parker is a 2009 recipient of the Distinguished Executive Presidential Rank Award and a 2013 
recipient of the Secretary of Defense Medal for Meritorious Civilian Service. Dr. Parker graduated from Texas A&M’s 
College of Veterinary Medicine, Baylor College of Medicine Graduate School of Biomedical Sciences, and the Industrial 
College of the Armed Forces.
Samantha Holt
Samantha Holt is a PhD candidate in Biomedical Engineering at Texas A&M University. Her 
research focus is developing novel hydrogel biomaterials for use in tissue engineering, with 
ultimate applications in regenerative medicine and modeling human diseases such as cancer. 
Currently, she is involved in program development and evaluation for the DeBakey Executive 
Research Leadership Program, which aims to improve leadership training for early-career 
researchers as well as facilitate undergraduate research education. She is active in community 
educational outreach including Saturday Morning Biophysics, an annual outreach program 
to encourage middle school and high school girls to pursue STEM careers. She holds a BS in 
Bioengineering from the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign, where she also worked as a marketing intern for the 
Office of Technology Management. Her policy interests include STEM higher education reform, consumer protections 
in the healthcare industry, particularly in light of emerging biomedical technologies, and biosecurity.
Austin Reid
Austin Reid is a graduate student at the Bush School of Government and Public Service at 
Texas A&M University studying cybersecurity and security policy management. He Graduated 
from Texas A&M University Galveston Campus with a bachelor’s of science in maritime 
administration in 2015. Austin has also been developing maritime sector cybersecurity case 
studies for use in educating future industry professionals. Before coming to the Bush School 
Austin Worked in the maritime industry overseeing breakbulk and automated container 
terminal operations. He has served as a stevedore superintendent in Mobile Alabama and in 
an operations monitoring role at a remote operations center in Texas for a leading automated 
container terminal on the west coast.
Lilianna Wolf
Lilianna Wolf is a researcher and graduate student at Texas A&M University. Her thesis 
research investigates the spread of disease among bats in Texas and Mexico. Aside from 
her research, Lilianna is a worker at the Scowcroft Institute of International Affairs at the 
Bush School of Government and Public Service where she contributes to projects examining 
issues of environmental conservation, conflict, and global health. Lilianna graduated with 
her bachelor's in Wildlife Biology from Texas A&M University in 2016. She has held research 
associate positions and positions in environmental consulting.
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President George H.W. Bush & Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft
“We live in an era of tremendous global change. Policy makers will confront unfamiliar 
challenges, new opportunities, and difficult choices in the years ahead. I look forward 
to the Scowcroft Institute supporting policy-relevant research that will contribute to our 
understanding of these changes, illuminating their implications for our national interest, 
and fostering lively exchanges about how the United States can help shape a world that 
best serves our interests and reflects our values.”
— Lt. Gen. Brent Scowcroft, USAF (Ret.)
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